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57 
Working Without a Net: Supreme Court 
Decision-Making as Performance 
Frederick Mark Gedicks* 
Up on the high wire, I hear the crowd begin to call. 
Some want you to fly, some want to see you fall. 
Now and then I stumble, but I ain’t fallen yet. 
Your love helps me forget, I’m workin’ without a net. 
—Waylon Jennings ** 
Though judges often portray themselves as helpless to alter case out-
comes dictated by law, this is mostly false humility. Judges are illusionists, 
and their opinions sleights of hand which obscure that they participate in 
creating what they purport merely to apply. This is especially the case in 
the Supreme Court, from which there is no appeal. The Justices perform 
the law, and their opinions are the records of these performances. 
Performance theory supplies a better means of analyzing Supreme 
Court decisions than ubiquitous and wearisome attacks on judicial 
integrity. The Court has its precedents, but they have no connection to a 
pre-existing natural order, and often not even to a determinate text. The 
Court’s readings of its precedents form a tradition that is rarely so fixed 
as to yield only one possible result in every case. This makes the Court’s 
constitutional decision-making the purest of performances—holdings and 
citations are “iterated,” shorn from their original contexts and dropped 
into new ones, creating new and surprising principles that masquerade as 
old and established. 
 
 *  Guy Anderson Chair & Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School. 
I received helpful criticisms and comments at an internal workshop at BYU Law School, and 
from Dr. Francesca Sborgi Lawson of the BYU College of Humanities, who introduced me to 
performance theory. James Egan, Ash McMurray, and Brianna Rosier provided excellent re-
search assistance. 
**  WAYLON JENNINGS, Working Without a Net, on WILL THE WOLF SURVIVE (MCA 
Records 1986). 
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It is unhelpful to call this dishonest. The Justices cannot admit their 
performative role because it cannot be reconciled with still-powerful 
higher-law and rule-of-law myths. The necessity of performing constitu-
tional law stems from the general absence of a single authoritative text that 
can constrain that performance; there are, instead, multiple interpretive 
possibilities, which makes performance inevitable. The Justices are always 
working without a net, performing constitutional law in opinions with 
nothing beneath them. 
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INTRODUCTION: PERFORMING LEGAL DECISION-MAKING 
In his celebrated history of American pragmatism, Louis 
Menand observed that a case coming to a court for decision “enters 
a kind of vortex of discursive imperatives”—the judge’s felt need 
to reach a result that is simultaneously faithful to precedent, 
beneficial to society, and just in itself.1 Less explicit but equally 
powerful pressures are also in play: to secure a politically congenial 
outcome, to shape the law to adhere to social conditions, to “punish 
 
 1. LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 339 (2001). 
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the wicked and excuse the good,” and to reallocate costs from 
“parties who can’t afford them” to “parties who can.”2 But hovering 
over all of these imperatives is a singular “meta-imperative”: “not 
to let it appear as though any one of these lesser imperatives has 
decided the case at the blatant expense of others.”3 A result that 
seems intuitively just but violates precedent “is taboo.”4 Justice 
cannot come at the expense of precedent, but precedent cannot 
eclipse justice; reckless behavior must be punished but not at the 
expense of socially desirable behavior; judgments must coincide 
with attractive political ends without appearing to distort the law 
to reach them.5 
Menand’s account of judicial decision is familiar to anyone who 
has studied or practiced law but is at serious odds with how judges 
portray their craft. Justice Owen Roberts’s Depression-era descrip-
tion of judicial minimalism is typical: 
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts 
as not conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial 
branch of the Government has only one duty,—to lay the article 
of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is 
challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the 
former. All the court does, or can do, is to announce its considered 
judgment upon the question.6 
Almost seventy years later, soon-to-be Chief Justice John 
Roberts invoked the national pastime to say nearly the same thing: 
Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they 
apply them. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . If I am confirmed, . . . I will decide every case based on the 
record, according to the rule of law, without fear or favor, to the 
best of my ability, and I will remember that it’s my job to call balls 
and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.7 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 339–40. 
 6. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62–63 (1936). 
 7. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56 (2005). 
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Both Justices articulated the conventional view of judging that 
is both descriptive and normative: judges merely apply, and ought 
merely to apply, principles or texts to the facts of the cases before 
them. The conventional view implies that legal principles and texts 
both pre-exist the judicial decision in which they are applied and 
possess a determinate and stable meaning that judges can objec-
tively retrieve, fully intact. Judges are and properly should be help-
less to alter the outcomes dictated by law. 
If Menand’s realist account is accurate, then the conventional 
view is mostly false humility. Judges are nothing so much as illu-
sionists, and their opinions sleights of hand which obscure that they 
are not bound by the law in the powerful sense they suggest but 
participate in creating what they purport merely to apply.8 This is 
especially the case with Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, from 
which there is no appeal. The Justices perform constitutional law, 
and their opinions are the records of these performances. 
Legal and academic literature has periodically compared legal 
decision-making to performance, lately using the performance 
theory that emerged in the humanities in the 1990s. These compar-
isons often focus on J.L. Austin’s argument about performativity in 
language,9 or use artistic (usually musical) performance as a loose 
metaphor to illustrate the bounded creativity of judicial decision-
making.10 Others have analyzed the performative dimensions of 
 
 8. My colleague Christine Hurt describes Justice Cardozo as a “magician” who was 
able to fashion brand-new common law rules as if they were the inevitable consequence of 
prior holdings. 
 9. See, e.g., Monica Eppinger, Sages, Savages, and Other Speech Act Communities: Culture 
in Comparative Law, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 407, 416 (2013); Trish Luker, Performance Anxieties: 
Interpellation of the Refugee Subject in Law, 30 CANADIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 91, 94 (2015). See generally 
J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962). 
 10. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 
47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1947); Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, 
Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 229 (1994); 
Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Book Review, 53 NOTES 419 (1996) [hereinafter Levinson & 
Balkin, Book Review] (reviewing RICHARD TARUSKIN, TEXT AND ACT: ESSAYS ON MUSIC AND 
PERFORMANCE (1995)); Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1597 (1991) [hereinafter Levinson & Balkin, Performing Arts] (reviewing 
AUTHENTICITY AND EARLY MUSIC (Nicholas Kenyon ed., 1988)); Brett G. Scharffs, Composing 
Law: The Lawyer as Composer, Part Two of Two, CLARK MEMORANDUM, Fall 2002, at 31; Carol 
Weisbrod, Fusion Folk: A Comment on Law and Music, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1439 (1999). 
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legally relevant social behavior,11 as well as courtroom trials.12 No 
one, however, has used performance theory as a metric for evalu-
ating constitutional decision-making by the Supreme Court and, in 
particular, its most daring quality: performance without a text. 
Performance theory supplies a better measure of Supreme 
Court decisions than ubiquitous attacks on the Justices’ integrity. 
Questioning the honesty of majority opinions is a pastime so 
common it hardly deserves mention, let alone a law review article.13 
Even the Justices indulge.14 Charging dishonesty is a favored 
rhetorical tactic of those whose own views differ from the Court’s 
or the other Justices’. It presupposes the existence of single correct 
(“honest”) answers to even complex constitutional questions;15 how 
else can one criticize the Justices for not telling the precedential 
truth? On the other hand, the Justices are often in a difficult spot. 
 
 11. See, e.g., KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL 
RIGHTS (2006) (using Erving Goffman’s performance theory to explore how gays and 
lesbians “cover” sexual orientation); see also Clare Huntington, Staging the Family, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 597 (2013) (showing how Goffman’s work and performance studies 
generally have impacted doctrinal, policy, and theoretical debates about family); Donald R. 
Korobkin, Bankruptcy Law, Ritual, and Performance, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 2124, 2124 (2003) 
(examining the performative structure of U.S. bankruptcy law); Kevin Noble Maillard & 
Janis L. McDonald, The Anatomy of Grey: A Theory of Interracial Convergence, 26 L. & INEQ. 
305, 316–18 (2008) (examining the “performativity” of “passing”); Sherally Munshi, You 
Will See My Family Became So American: Toward a Minor Comparativism, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 
655, 693 (2015) (describing how new American citizens perform Americanism); Gerald R. 
Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 25–41 (1996) (describing 
negotiation as a “ritual” in which participants play roles). 
 12. See, e.g., Jessie Allen, Theater of International Justice, 3 CREIGHTON INT’L & COMP. L.J. 
131 (2012) (using Richard Schechner’s work to assess the effectiveness of international 
human rights tribunals); Emiliano J. Buis, How to Play Justice and Drama in Antiquity: Law and 
Theater in Athens as Performative Rituals, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 697 (2004) (comparing the 
performative elements of Greek theory and jury trials); see also Ariela Gross, Beyond Black and 
White: Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640, 645–54 (2001) 
(analyzing slavery and race trials as performances); Caroline Wake, Caveat Spectator: Juridical, 
Political and Ontological False Witnessing in CMI (A Certain Maritime Incident), 14 L. TEXT 
CULTURE 160, 162 (2010) (exploring how performance studies research might illuminate 
theories of witnessing). 
 13. See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant, Nigro v. United States: The Most Disingenuous 
Supreme Court Opinion, Ever, 12 NEV. L.J. 650 (2012); Abigail Thernstrom & Stephan 
Thernstrom, Secrecy and Dishonesty: The Supreme Court, Racial Preferences, and Higher Edu-
cation, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 265 (2004). 
 14. See, e.g., Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2808 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., joined 
by Ginsburg & Kagan, JJ., dissenting) (“Those who are bound by our decisions usually 
believe they can take us at our word. Not so today.”). 
 15. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE ch. 5 (1986). 
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The continuing power of “higher-law” and “rule-of-law” myths 
forces them to conform their opinions to a natural-law world view 
whose conceptual underpinnings have dissolved: that judges must 
only “find” and never “make” the law they apply. 
This Essay argues that decision-making in the Supreme Court 
is best understood as a performance of precedent that can be 
criticized on that ground. Part I sketches a working definition of 
“performance” drawn from the relatively new field of performance 
studies, illustrating its paradoxical combination of present and 
past, copy and original, creation and reenactment. Part II shows 
how two path-breaking decisions in the Supreme Court’s devel-
opment of religious free-exercise doctrine, Employment Division v. 
Smith and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,16 succeeded and failed 
as judicial performances. Part III generalizes the point these cases 
exemplify: the shift of American jurisprudence from natural law to 
positivism forced judges into a performative role in which they 
surreptitiously create constitutional law while denying they do so. 
Criticism of the Court, therefore, should focus, not on whether it 
has been “honest” in choosing and reading its precedents, but on 
whether its performance of them is recognizable as performance—
that is, as a recitation of precedent that is faithful and creative. The 
Essay concludes with an ironic sketch, illustrating how perform-
ance illuminates the absurdity and inevitability of the conventional 
view of judicial decision-making. 
I. THE PARADOX OF PERFORMING 
Performance theory emerged as a distinct academic field in the 
1990s. The pioneers were departments of “performance studies” 
established at New York University and Northwestern University 
in the early 1980s.17 Both sought to enlarge the study of 
performance from the “performing arts”—music, dance, theatre—
 
 16. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). While formally Hobby Lobby was a statutory decision interpreting the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the close relation of RFRA to the Free Exercise Clause 
and the Court’s free-exercise decisions makes it de facto constitutional. Cf. Ira C. Lupu, 
Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
 17. See generally RICHARD SCHECHNER, PERFORMANCE STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION 
ch. 1 (3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter SCHECHNER, PERFORMANCE STUDIES] (recounting the develop-
ment of performance studies as a distinct academic discipline). 
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to a “broad spectrum” of activities also marked by performativity—
”rituals, healing, sports, popular entertainments, and performance 
in everyday life.”18 
Performance is a paradoxical combination of enactment and 
reenactment, presentation and representation. Richard Schechner, a 
major figure in performance studies, defines “performance” as 
“twice-behaved” or “restored” behavior.19 (I will generally use the 
latter term.) As restored behavior, performance is the repetition of 
behavior first effectuated elsewhere according to “some pre-existing 
model, script, or pattern of action” that the performance follows.20 
Restored behavior is an obvious characteristic of art forms that 
require rehearsal, training, or practice, like the performing arts, but 
it is also a quality of ordinary life, as Erving Goffman first claimed.21 
Activity in the workplace, for example, is a self-presentation crucial 
to both one’s own sense of self and the impressions formed by 
workplace peers.22 
What is true of the workplace is true of every dimension of 
ordinary life. Like the performing arts, “everyday life also involves 
years of training and practice, of learning appropriate culturally 
specific bits of behavior, of adjusting and performing one’s life roles 
in relation to social and personal circumstances.”23 Like the theatre, 
life consists of a “front” visible to others, and a “back” whose 
inaccessibility encourages the illusion that one’s visible behavior is 
unrehearsed and all there is.24 Victor Turner elaborated: “[A]ll 
social interaction is staged—people prepare backstage, confront 
others while wearing masks and playing roles, use the main stage 
area for the performance of routines, and so on.”25 Ordinary life is 
 
 18. Richard Schechner, Performance Studies: The Broad Spectrum Approach, in THE PER-
FORMANCE STUDIES READER 7, 7–8 (Henry Bial ed., 2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter Schechner, Broad 
Spectrum] (“Performing arts curricula need to . . . add[] . . . how performance is used in politics, 
medicine, religion, popular entertainments, and ordinary face-to-face interactions.”). 
 19. SCHECHNER, PERFORMANCE STUDIES, supra note 17, at 28–29. 
 20. MARVIN CARLSON, PERFORMANCE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12 (2d ed. 2004); see 
also SCHECHNER, PERFORMANCE STUDIES, supra note 17, at 35 (“[A]ll behavior is restored 
behavior—all behavior consists of recombining bits of previously behaved behaviors.”). 
 21. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959). 
 22. E.g., id. at 47, 55–56, 64. 
 23. SCHECHNER, PERFORMANCE STUDIES, supra note 17, at 28–29. 
 24. GOFFMAN, supra note 21, at 107–19. 
 25. VICTOR TURNER, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF PERFORMANCE 74 (1986). 
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rehearsed, like a play or a dance. As Goffman observed, “The 
world, in truth, is a wedding.”26 
Even events that stand out from ordinary life can be understood 
as twice-behaved despite their apparent singularity.  “[T]he ‘latest,’ 
‘original,’ ‘shocking,’ or ‘avant-garde’ is mostly either a new com-
bination of known behaviors or the displacement of a behavior” 
from a known to an unexpected context or occasion.27 For example, 
many Americans saw the seemingly unprecedented terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 through the lens of Pearl Harbor, including even 
those too young to have had a personal memory of Pearl Harbor.28 
As restored behavior, performance presupposes origins from 
which one is temporally distanced. Bits of previous behaviors are 
recombined in present performances, yet no single implementation 
or execution of such recombinations is the same as another.29 
Performative behavior is “‘twice-behaved,’ made up of new combi-
nations of previously enacted doings.”30 In its simplest form, 
performance is pretending to be someone else by self-consciously 
re-enacting the other’s previously enacted behavior.31 
An early and important illustration of the paradoxical character 
of performance was Albert Lord’s The Singer of Tales.32 Lord argued 
that the epic poems of Western literature were oral rather than 
literary.33 He showed that the Iliad, the Odyssey, Beowulf, and other 
oral poems were not recitations of pre-existing written texts, but 
free-flowing oral presentations: 
 The poet who first sang these songs . . . never thought of his 
song as being at any time fixed either as to content or as to 
wording. He was the author of each singing. And those singers 
who learned from him the song of Achilles or that of Odysseus 
continued the changes of oral tradition in their performances; and 
each of them was author of each of his own singings. The songs 
 
 26. GOFFMAN, supra note 21, at 36. 
 27. SCHECHNER, PERFORMANCE STUDIES, supra note 17, at 35. 
 28. See, e.g., Eric L. Muller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104 
W. VA. L. REV. 571 (2002). 
 29. CARLSON, supra note 20, at 47; SCHECHNER, PERFORMANCE STUDIES, supra note 17, 
at 30, 35; see also supra text accompanying note 23. 
 30. SCHECHNER, PERFORMANCE STUDIES, supra note 17, at 220. 
 31. CARLSON, supra note 20, at 3. 
 32. ALBERT B. LORD, THE SINGER OF TALES (1960). 
 33. See, e.g., id. at 141–49. 
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were ever in flux and were crystallized by each singer only when 
he sat before an audience and told them the tale. It was an old tale 
that he had heard from others but that telling was his own.34 
Lord’s analysis of oral poems illustrates performance’s para-
doxical combination of iteration and singularity. The performance 
of these oral poems followed a narrative pattern, always telling a 
particular story but in a different way. The poem was realized only 
in its performance; there was no absent text brought into presence 
by its recitation.35 The performance was the poem and all of it that 
could be said to exist. Such performances were never and could 
never be the same, though each one followed a narrative template 
that told the same story differently. 
A. Iterability and Citability 
A performance is paradoxically both copy and original.36 It is 
composed of “iterations” or “citations” of previously behaved 
behavior, and yet re-presents this previous behavior through 
activity that is but fleetingly there, an ephemeral presentness that 
exists only in the moment. The thematization of performance is 
thus intellectually indebted to Jacques Derrida’s analysis of iter-
ation and citation in writing and language. Derrida argued that 
writing is constituted by the absence of both author and addressee, 
capable of functioning, of “meaning,” in the absence of both.37 The 
essential characteristic of written signs, in other words, is their 
“iterability”—their ability to constitute meaning even in the ab-
sence of the original context that first stabilized their meaning.38 
Iterability characterizes all utterances. Every sign, oral or 
written, linguistic or nonlinguistic, simple or complex, can be 
“cited”—“cut off, at a certain point, from its ‘original’ desire-to-say-
what-one-means . . . and from its participation in a saturable and 
constraining context.”39 By putting words in quotation marks, one 
 
 34. Id. at 151–52. 
 35. Id. at 219. 
 36. See SCHECHNER, PERFORMANCE STUDIES, supra note 17, at 30. 
 37. See Jacques Derrida, Signature Event Context (Samuel Weber & Jeffrey Mehlman 
trans., 1977), in JACQUES DERRIDA, LIMITED INC 7–9 (Gerald Graff ed., 1988). 
 38. Id. at 7, 10. 
 39. Id. at 12. 
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can sever them from “every given context, engendering an infinity 
of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable.”40 
Iterability and citation enable the repetition or representation of 
a behavior in a different context that accordingly produces a dif-
ferent meaning. The context for the original behavior may not be 
known; even if it is, the original context cannot control the meaning 
of its own citation. Over time, the original of restored behavior may 
recede into a barely remembered background as part of an ima-
gined or mythic narrative of origin. 
Successful performances cite a pre-existing set of words whose 
invocation achieves the intended performative effect.41 But because 
a citation is necessarily shorn from its original authorial context and 
placed in another, the intention of the author or speaker who first 
wrote or spoke the cited text or utterance does not determine its 
performative meaning; in citation, intention cannot “govern the en-
tire scene and system of utterance,” because “the intention animat-
ing the utterance will never be through and through present to itself 
and to its content.”42 
It is ironic that citations are invoked as pre-existing authorities 
when their cited content and meaning are not determinate and 
stable. Judith Butler concludes that a citation does not possess 
authority because it points to particularized meaning, but acquires 
its authority rather through a repetition that actually obscures 
its indeterminacy: 
 If a performative provisionally succeeds . . . , then it is not 
because an intention successfully governs the action of speech, 
but only because that action echoes prior actions, and accumulates 
the force of authority through the repetition or citation of a prior 
and authoritative set of practices. . . . [A] performative “works” to 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. at 18. 
Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a 
“coded” or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in 
order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as 
conforming with an iterable model, if it were not then identifiable in some way as 
a “citation”? 
Id. 
 42. Id. 
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the extent that it draws on and covers over the constitutive 
conventions by which it is mobilized.43 
Even the “improper” use of a performative—that is, the citation 
of a text or utterance in a way or for a meaning that seems to 
contradict its original meaning—“can succeed in producing the 
effect of authority where there is no recourse to a prior author-
ization.”44 (E.g., “#FakeNews!”) Citations are performatives that do 
not simply re-cite prior meanings but produce their own meanings 
and effects in reciting the original.45 
Schechner employed the evocative metaphor of the film 
director to capture the iterative character of performance.46 The 
director cuts and splices filmed “strips” of scenes—recorded 
performances—into a unified narrative that did not previously 
exist.47 In this view, life itself consists of “citation”—the endless 
composition and recomposition of “known bits of behavior re-
arranged and shaped in order to suit specific circumstances.”48 
In sum, citations are pre-existing texts or previously enacted 
behaviors that can be repeated. Their iterative character permits 
their removal from prior contexts and their placement into new 
ones, while still continuing to have meaning. Because the prior 
contexts (including the intentions of the author or speaker) are not 
present to the new context, they cannot control the cited text’s or 
restored behavior’s meaning, which is instead determined by the 
new context.49 
 
 43. JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 51 (1997) 
(emphasis deleted). 
 44. Id. at 158. 
 45. Id. at 158–59. 
 46. RICHARD SCHECHNER, BETWEEN THEATRE AND ANTHROPOLOGY 35–36 (1985). 
 47. Id. Schechner was apparently inspired by Erving Goffman’s notion of “strips of 
experience”—“sequences or happenings” set apart “from the ongoing stream of human 
behavior” that can be manipulated or managed, replicated and transformed to create 
different meanings. See CARLSON, supra note 20, at 45–47 (discussing ERVING GOFFMAN, 
FRAME ANALYSIS 10 (1974)). 
 48. SCHECHNER, PERFORMANCE STUDIES, supra note 17, at 29. 
 49. Id. at 34–35. 
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B. “Once-ness” and “This-ness” 
Performance theory thematizes human activity in the moment, 
at a particular time and place.50 It is accordingly focused on the bo-
dy. Unlike a written text, which can be read repeatedly and without 
respect to its place of origin, the bodily activity that constitutes 
performance can take place only at a particular time and in a parti-
cular space.51 
The term “thisness” captures this notion that performance em-
bodies a unique encounter in time and space that did not exist 
before and will not exist again.52 It challenges the assumption that 
the “aura” of a work is something attached to or embedded in the 
work that underwrites its authenticity.53 The aura is instead per-
formative, an experience of the work in time and space made pos-
sible by encountering it under particular, even unique, conditions: 
[A] performance is not just any performance—it is this perfor-
mance of a work that is a text . . . . Though the text may have the 
same words, appearing in the same order, and may even be spoken 
by any person—each time it is encountered in a performance it is 
a text, this text.54 
“Once-ness” and “thisness” compose the awareness of the 
singular “be-here-now” that happens in performance, even when 
the performance is of a written or familiar text.55 
 
 50. See Schechner, Broad Spectrum, supra note 18, at 8 (noting the “complex and various 
relationships among the players in the performance quadrilog—authors, performers, direc-
tors, and spectators”). 
 51. See, e.g., W.B. Worthen, Disciplines of the Text: Sites of Performance, in THE PERFOR-
MANCE STUDIES READER, supra note 18, at 10. 
 52. The term was coined by Gordon Coonfield & Heidi Rose, What Is Called Presence, 
32 TEXT & PERFORMANCE Q. 192, 192 (2012). 
 53. Id. at 193 (discussing Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction, in WALTER BENJAMIN, ILLUMINATIONS 220–21 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn 
trans., 1968)). 
 54. Coonfield & Rose, supra note 52, at 201. 
 55. Id. at 194. 
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II. PERFORMING FREE EXERCISE 
The Free Exercise Clause constrains federal and state 
governments from “prohibiting” the “free exercise” of religion.56 
When the Supreme Court first applied this clause to the states,57 it 
construed the clause to protect absolutely a freedom to believe 
whatever one wishes, but to protect only conditionally the freedom 
to act out such beliefs. The First Amendment “embraces two 
concepts—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is 
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”58 
Action, the Court reasoned, must be subject to government regu-
lation for the good of society.59 
This “belief/action” distinction initially yielded scant pro-
tection for religious exercise,60 but the Court soon announced a 
more protective doctrine in Sherbert v. Verner.61 Considering the 
appeal of a Seventh-Day Adventist who had lost her job and then 
been denied unemployment benefits because she refused to work 
on Saturday (her Sabbath), the Court held that a state may burden 
religious exercise only if doing so is necessary to a “compelling” or 
especially important government interest.62 
The Court strengthened this “compelling-interest” test in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, a 1972 decision in which the Court excused a 
group of Amish parents from sending their children to public 
school beyond the eighth grade despite a state law requiring atten-
dance until age sixteen.63 The parents claimed that the high school 
environment was so corrosive of Amish values that compulsory 
attendance would threaten their ability to pass their religion on to 
 
 56. The full text reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 57. Although by its terms the Free Exercise Clause binds only the federal government, 
the Supreme Court “incorporated” it against the states in 1940 through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 58. Id. at 303–04. 
 59. Id. at 304. 
 60. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (holding that the Sunday closing 
law did not burden the religious exercise of an orthodox Jewish merchant whose religion 
forbade working Friday night and Saturday, because the burden was only “indirect”). 
 61. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 62. Id. at 403, 406–07. 
 63. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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the next generation.64 Though preparing children to become 
productive and informed citizens through compulsory school at-
tendance is a quintessentially “compelling” government interest,65 
the Court held that the state lacked a compelling interest in enforc-
ing the law against the Amish, because the practical training they 
provided their teenaged children constituted an adequate sub-
stitute for compulsory public education.66 
The Court affirmed this “compelling-interest” test multiple 
times over the ensuing years, strengthening it in modest respects,67 
but also carving out notable exceptions.68 Although the compelling-
interest test was articulated in language almost identical to that of 
the “strict scrutiny” the Court uses in equal protection and fun-
damental rights cases,69 the Court applied the compelling-interest 
test with much less rigor. Whereas government action rarely 
satisfies strict scrutiny of suspect classifications or interference with 
fundamental rights, the courts frequently upheld government 
 
 64. Id. at 217–19. 
 65. See id. at 221–22. 
 66. Id. at 225–26, 228–29, 235–36. 
 67. See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834–35 (1989) (holding a 
claimant need not belong to an organized religion or sect to receive protection from the 
compelling-interest test, so long as the burdened religious practice is sincerely held); Thomas 
v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1981) (holding a claimant’s 
religious views need not conform to the normal understanding of others of his faith). 
 68. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) 
(holding the compelling-interest test does not apply to burdens on religious exercise caused 
by government’s management of its real property); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 
(1987) (same with respect to burdens on religious exercise of prison inmates); Bowen v. Roy, 
476 U.S. 693 (1986) (same with respect to burdens caused by government’s management of 
its internal affairs); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (same with respect to 
burdens on religious exercise of members of military). 
 69. Compare Thomas, 450 U.S. at 708 (“The state may justify an inroad on religious 
liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state 
interest.”), and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1982) (“The state may justify a 
limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding 
governmental interest.”), with Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) 
(“[Racial and ethnic] classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored 
measures that further compelling governmental interests.”), and Sable Commc’ns v. FCC, 
492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The Government may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally 
protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive 
means to further the articulated interest.”). 
 
2.GEDICKS_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/17/18  10:37 AM 
57 Working Without a Net 
 71 
action that burdened religious exercise under the compelling-
interest test. 70 
A. Employment Division v. Smith (1990) 
Then suddenly, all this changed. Although the Court unambig-
uously affirmed the compelling-interest test in 1989,71 one year later 
it reversed course. In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court held 
that the Free Exercise Clause offers no protection against incidental 
government burdens on religious exercise generated by general 
and neutral laws.72 The claimants in Smith were members of the 
Native American Church who lost their jobs as drug rehabilitation 
counselors and were subsequently denied unemployment benefits 
because they participated in a Church ritual that included the 
ingestion of peyote, a state-prohibited hallucinogenic.73 The lower 
court ruled that the criminality of the religious activity was not a 
justification for denying unemployment insurance benefits, and the 
state unemployment commission appealed to the Supreme Court.74 
The Court reversed, holding that termination for criminal 
activity distinguished this case from its many prior precedents 
upholding one’s right to unemployment benefits when terminated 
because of religious activity.75 The Court might have stopped there, 
having merely clarified yet another exception to the compelling-
interest test, for criminal violations. But it was intent on more. “We 
have never held,” insisted the Court, “that an individual’s religious 
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law 
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”76 Then it 
doubled down: “On the contrary, the record of more than a century 
of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.”77 
Although Yoder had been understood to inform the compelling-
 
 70. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 815 (2006) (government has historically 
satisfied strict scrutiny in 59% of religious exemption cases, but only 27% of racial and other 
suspect-class discrimination cases). 
 71. Frazee, 489 U.S. at 835. 
 72. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 73. Id. at 875. 
 74. Id. at 876. 
 75. Id. at 876, 882. 
 76. Id. at 878–79. 
 77. Id. at 879. 
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interest test, the Court refashioned it into a “hybrid-rights” 
exception: “The only decisions in which we have held that the First 
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law 
to religiously motivated actions have involved not the Free Exercise 
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other 
constitutional protections . . . .”78 Yoder, in this telling, was never an 
important interpretation of the compelling-interest test, but only 
the exceptional coincidence of a free-exercise claim with a due-
process parental-rights claim. 
The Court similarly cabined Sherbert and its progeny by reading 
them as an exception triggered when bureaucrats exercise discre-
tion in granting or denying government benefits: “[A] distinctive 
feature of unemployment compensation programs is that their 
eligibility criteria invite consideration of the particular circum-
stances behind an applicant’s unemployment.”79 Accordingly, 
“[W]here the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, 
it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hard-
ship’ without compelling reason.”80 
When the dust cleared in Smith, the Court had eliminated 
constitutional free-exercise claims when a law incidentally (as op-
posed to intentionally) burdens religious practice.81 Although Smith 
remains controversial in some quarters, the Court has repeatedly 
affirmed it.82 
B. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014) 
Smith created a firestorm of controversy over the Court’s 
wholesale revision of free-exercise doctrine. In short order, Con-
gress enacted and the President signed the Religious Freedom 
 
 78. Id. at 881. 
 79. Id. at 884. 
 80. Id. 
 81. A subsequent decision clarified that the compelling-interest test continues to apply 
to laws that target religion as such. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 82. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759–61 (2014); 
Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 694 n.24 (2010); Gonzalez v. O Centro 
Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 
U.S. 709, 715 (2005); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515 (1997); see also Hosanna-
Tabor Evangel. Lutheran Ch. & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (unanimous decision) 
(distinguishing Smith). 
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Restoration Act (RFRA), which provides that government may not 
burden the exercise of religion unless the burden is the “least-
restrictive means” of pursuing a “compelling governmental inter-
est.”83 RFRA thus echoed the compelling-interest test of the Court’s 
pre-Smith free-exercise doctrine, and it was widely assumed that it 
had simply statutorily enacted the modestly heightened scrutiny of 
incidental burdens on religion that the Court had constitutionally 
abandoned in Smith.84 
This understanding unraveled in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc.85 There, the conservative Christian owners of Hobby Lobby 
sought a RFRA exemption from the so-called “contraception 
mandate” of the Affordable Care Act, which requires employer and 
other health plans to cover all FDA-approved contraceptives 
without “cost-sharing”—that is, without additional out-of-pocket 
expense beyond the basic insurance premium.86 Believing that life 
begins at conception, Hobby Lobby and its owners religiously ob-
jected to health plan coverage of IUDs and other emergency contra-
ception that occasionally prevent pregnancy after conception, on 
the ground that these methods are tantamount to  abortion.87 
The mandate categorically exempted churches and other “hous-
es of worship” and also included a complex accommodation of the 
religious objections of religious nonprofit businesses such as reli-
giously sponsored hospitals, colleges, and social service agencies.88 
No comparable accommodation was provided to business corpo-
rations or their owners with religious scruples about contraception.89 
 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). Four years after RFRA’s passage the Court held it 
inapplicable to state action. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535–36. 
 84. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 546 U.S. at 424 (construing RFRA to have “adopt[ed] a statutory 
rule comparable to the constitutional rule rejected in Smith”). 
 85. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751. 
 86. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(i)–(a)(1)(iv); see Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762. Hobby 
Lobby’s claim was consolidated with that of another business corporation also owned by 
conservative Christian shareholders, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation. 
 87. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764–65. 
 88. For details about the mandate and its various exemptions and accommodations, 
see Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contracep-
tion Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES 
L. REV. 343, 350–56 (2014). 
 89. The government never sought to explain why it did not include business 
corporations within the religious nonprofit accommodation. It might have assumed that 
since the Court had never granted a religious exemption to a business corporation or its 
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The Court held in Hobby Lobby that the “least-restrictive means” 
component of RFRA’s compelling-interest test required the exten-
sion of the religious nonprofit accommodation to business cor-
porations and their owners who religiously object to some or all of 
the mandated contraception coverage.90 The Court reasoned that 
since the government already had in place the accommodation for 
religious nonprofits, which still accomplished its goal of contra-
ception coverage without cost-sharing, RFRA’s least-restrictive 
means requirement obligated extension of that exemption to Hobby 
Lobby and other closely held business corporations and share-
holders with the same objections.91 Recognizing that the Court’s 
pre-Smith precedents had never found the compelling-interest test 
to entail such a strict alternatives analysis, the Court rendered those 
precedents irrelevant by ruling that RFRA’s statutory least-
restrictive means test effected a “complete separation” from the 
pre-Smith cases.92 
One precedent remained standing. In United States v. Lee, the 
Court had refused to exempt an Amish employer from paying So-
cial Security taxes for his employees because of the complexity of 
the social security taxing scheme,93 even though participation in 
social welfare programs seriously burdened his religion and 
Congress had exempted self-employed Amish from paying such 
 
shareholders, confining the accommodation to religious nonprofit businesses was a plausible 
and easily administered exemption boundary. Cf. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2773 (“HHS and 
the principal dissent fall back on the broader contention that the Nation lacks a tradition of 
exempting for-profit corporations from generally applicable laws.”). Because the accom-
modation is not costless when claimed by self-insured entities and their owners, the 
government might have feared that extending the accommodation to the vastly larger for-
profit sector would exhaust available funds and undermine the mandate’s goal of universal 
no-cost contraception coverage, with little prospect of additional funding from a polarized 
and hostile Congress. Cf. Andrew Koppelman & Frederick M. Gedicks, Is Hobby Lobby 
Worse for Religious Liberty than Smith?, 9 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223 (2015) (explain-
ing how extending the accommodation to business corporations could dramatically increase 
its cost to the government, and noting that elimination of federal contraception funding 
programs is a long term goal of the same political coalition that opposes the mandate). 
 90. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780–83. 
 91. Id.; see also id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing that extending the non-
profit accommodation to closely held business corporations and their owners was a less 
restrictive alternative to imposition of the mandate, but expressing doubt that enactment of 
an entirely new government program of contraception insurance or payment was such 
an alternative). 
 92. Id. at 2762; see also id. at 2761 n.3, 2767 n.18. 
 93. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). 
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taxes on their own wages for precisely that reason.94 The Court 
distinguished Lee from the contraception mandate on the ground 
that the courts owe special deference to congressional exemption 
decisions in complex revenue-raising programs.95 
RFRA emerged from Hobby Lobby as a far more robust 
safeguard of religious exercise than the pre-Smith exemption cases 
it purported to restore. In particular, Hobby Lobby marked the 
Court’s commitment to a stringent understanding of the least-
restrictive means component of RFRA’s compelling-interest test. 
C. Performance Reviews 
Judicial opinions share some of the temporal, tactile, and other 
embodied characteristics that constitute the “thisness” of per-
formance despite being in writing.96 They are announced at prede-
termined times during open sessions of the Court, which the 
Justices attend in judicial robes. For each case, all or part of the 
majority opinion is often read from the bench by the Justice who 
wrote it, followed by readings of concurring and dissenting 
opinions by other Justices. News media frequently report the vigor 
and emotion with which the Justices read their opinions as well as 
the atmosphere in the courtroom. Though it persists as a writing, 
the judicial opinion nevertheless constitutes a sorting out of unique 
factors in time and space, history and culture, which will not occur 
again under identical conditions. 
Smith and Hobby Lobby are thus instances of restored behavior 
despite their writtenness. Each opinion is a singular event; sub-
sequent opinions follow and cite each of them, but no subsequent 
opinion will ever be “them”—that is, will ever capture in writing 
their distinct disassembly, reconstruction, and erasure of free-
exercise precedents into entirely new doctrine. The Court’s accounts 
of free-exercise doctrine in Smith and Hobby Lobby exhibited the 
paradoxical iteration and singularity of performances—restored 
behavior rearranged to create an original. But the opinions were not 
 
 94. Id. at 255–56, 255 n.4. 
 95. Id. at 259. 
 96. See Coonfield & Rose, supra note 52, at 198. On the other hand, the vigor and 
emotion with which the Justices read their opinions from the bench, and the corresponding 
atmosphere in the courtroom, are often noted by media and others who report on the Court. 
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performative equals: Smith’s performance is defensible, even bril-
liant, while Hobby Lobby’s is neither. 
1. Performing Smith 
Smith was controversial, to be sure; creative performances often 
are. Smith is easy to criticize as doctrine. It eliminated a modest-yet-
meaningful protection of religious exercise burdened by govern-
ment action. The rate of constitutional invalidation under the pre-
Smith compelling-interest test, while significantly lower than the 
corresponding rate in equal protection and fundamental rights 
cases, was still substantially higher than the rate in cases subject to 
minimal rational-basis scrutiny, which almost never results in 
invalidation of government action.97 Smith eliminated this pro-
tection by decontextualizing the Court’s free-exercise precedents 
and re-contextualizing them to signify the opposite of what they had 
long been understood to mean. Smith turned free-exercise doctrine 
inside-out: the compelling-interest test announced in Sherbert and 
strengthened in Yoder was recast as the exception, while previous 
exceptions became the rule. 
And yet, Smith is defensible as performance. Its major doctrinal 
surgery was bracing, but also plausible, addressing a serious and 
growing problem: the implausibility of applying heightened 
judicial scrutiny to incidental as well as targeted burdens on 
religious practice. The United States is a religiously plural social 
welfare state with an impossibly diverse range of religious belief 
that is constantly ensnared in a vast web of regulations and 
entitlements. Application of the compelling-interest test to every 
religiously burdensome government action threatened a world in 
which believers might seek exemption from every law the 
government might enact. As the Court reasoned, 
Precisely because we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of 
people of almost every conceivable religious preference, and 
precisely because we value and protect that religious divergence, 
we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as 
applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that 
does not protect an interest of the highest order. The rule 
 
 97. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
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[claimants] favor would open the prospect of constitutionally 
required exemptions from civic obligations of almost every 
conceivable kind . . . .98 
This conundrum has only increased in the years since, as diversity, 
regulation, and entitlements have grown apace. 
There were answers to the Court’s (somewhat exaggerated) 
specter of religious-exemption chaos, but their preservation of the 
compelling-interest test entailed unacceptable costs. One might 
have confined the compelling-interest test to burdens on “central” 
or “important” religious practices. This, however, would have 
violated the Establishment Clause prohibition on government 
entanglement in religious doctrine.99 It is difficult to imagine a 
clearer establishment of religion than a doctrinal regime in which 
courts tell religions which of their practices are central to their faith 
and which are not. As the Court noted in Smith, “[C]ourts must not 
presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or 
the plausibility of a religious claim.”100 
Alternatively, one could have made explicit what had become 
clear by the time Smith was decided: that the compelling-interest 
test was, at best, a modest form of heightened scrutiny despite its 
linguistic resemblance to the classic strict scrutiny of equal pro-
tection and fundamental rights analysis.101 Its pre-Smith application 
to incidental burdens, therefore, was not a major obstacle to social 
welfare regulations and other entitlements that licensed wide-
spread violation of law. The Court, however, correctly (and 
presciently) noted that calling different tests by the same name was 
bound to end badly, confounding different doctrines of consti-
tutional law,102 and risking dilution of classic strict scrutiny in equal 
 
 98. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 99. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 
171, 183–84 (2012); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724 (1976); 
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 131 (1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
679, 729 (1872). 
 100. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887. 
 101. E.g., Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1175, 1215 (1996); James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91, 
101–04 (1991). 
 102. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886. 
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protection and fundamental rights contexts in which exacting 
judicial review is crucial to the protection of important norms.103 
In the end, the Court in Smith persuasively reread its free-
exercise precedents to have already eliminated claims for relief 
from purely incidental government burdens on religion. Its 
performance was not without hiccups; the “hybrid-rights” ex-
ception for Yoder is a doctrinal line-drop if ever there was one, and 
it remains baffling that the Court would quote an overturned 
precedent as authority.104 Nevertheless, the limitations of generality 
and neutrality and the dangers of standardless discretion that it 
read from the remaining pre-Smith decisions are plausible construc-
tions that leave those decisions in recognizable (if altered) form. 
The success of the Court’s precedential performance in Smith is 
perhaps best evidenced by its wide (if sometimes grudging) accept-
ance across most of the church/state spectrum.105 
2. Performing Hobby Lobby 
Hobby Lobby should be so fortunate. To justify its decision there, 
the Court had to rewrite or ignore history (it did some of both). 
The Court there faced the reciprocal of the problem it resolved in 
Smith, the possibility that the social welfare state, if left unchecked, 
would leave no activity outside home and congregation un-
regulated, thus driving believers from public life or forcing them to 
abandon their faith as the price of participation.106 But its solution 
to this problem had all the subtlety of a blunt-force instrument. 
The Court attempted to demonstrate that RFRA had not, in fact, 
enacted the modest balancing test of the pre-Smith cases, but the 
classic and rigorous strict scrutiny applied to suspect classifications 
and violations of fundamental rights. The Court was aided by its 
 
 103. Id. at 888. 
 104. Justice Scalia quoted Minersville School District Board of Education v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 
586, 594–95 (1940), in support of his majority opinion without noting that the decision was 
overruled only three years later by West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943). See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. 
 105. E.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Political (and Other) Safeguards of Religious Freedom, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1815 (2011) (accommodationist defense of Smith); William P. Marshall, In 
Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991) (separationist 
defense of Smith). 
 106. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 n.37 (2014). 
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own prior error. In City of Boerne v. Flores, relying on a dictum 
apparently drawn from the city’s brief,107 the Court called RFRA’s 
compelling interest standard the “most demanding test known to 
constitutional law,”108 and further found that the test “was not used 
in the pre-Smith jurisprudence.”109 Both of these statements were 
flatly wrong, directly contradicting both the pre-Smith exemption 
cases and RFRA’s statutory text and legislative history. 
The pre-Smith cases expressly recognized a least-restrictive 
means component of the compelling-interest test; they just did not 
apply it with the rigor used in classic strict scrutiny.110 RFRA, 
moreover, expressly identified Sherbert, Yoder, and other pre-Smith 
decisions as the source of the standard of review that the statute 
meant to restore,111 calling the compelling-interest standard they 
applied “a workable test for striking sensible balances between 
religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.”112 It 
is impossible to imagine, by contrast, a contemporary Congress’s 
calling classic strict scrutiny in equal protection cases “a workable 
standard for striking sensible balances between the rights of racial 
minorities to equal treatment and competing government interests 
in racial discrimination”; strict scrutiny is applied in such cases 
precisely to invalidate racial discrimination by government in 
 
 107. Martin S. Lederman, Reconstructing RFRA: The Contested Legacy of Religious Freedom 
Restoration, 125 YALE L.J.F. 416, 431 (2016). Lederman speculates that for tactical reasons 
neither the United States nor the opposing party wished to dispute this characterization. Id. 
at 431–32. 
 108. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997). 
 109. Id. at 535. 
 110. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1982) (“The state may justify a 
limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding 
governmental interest.”); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (“The state may 
justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of 
achieving some compelling state interest.”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 397–98 (1963) 
(Even assuming that the state’s interests in preventing fraud were sufficiently weighty to 
justify denying claimant unemployment benefits, “it would plainly be incumbent upon [the 
state] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses 
without infringing First Amendment rights.”); Braunfeld v. Braun, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) 
(A statute that incidentally burdens religious exercise does not violate the Free Exercise 
Clause “unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such 
a burden.”). 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012) (declaring that a purpose of RFRA was “to restore 
the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder”) (cita-
tions omitted). 
 112. Id. § 2000bb(a)(5). 
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almost all circumstances.113 And certainly it would have made little 
sense for Congress to speak of “restoring” classic strict scrutiny 
when the Court had never before applied such a rigorous standard 
in religious exercise cases. 
RFRA’s legislative history is also replete with assurances by 
congressional committees and individual members that RFRA 
would merely enact the compelling-interest test that was in the 
Court’s pre-Smith jurisprudence.114 When RFRA’s passage was 
threatened by a coalition of anti-abortion activists who feared 
RFRA would create a federal statutory right to abortion for those 
whose religious beliefs might compel abortion in particular 
circumstances, its co-sponsors clarified that RFRA would enact 
only the modest balancing text of the pre-Smith compelling-interest 
standard, not the strict scrutiny traditionally applied to suspect 
classifications or violations of fundamental rights like access to 
abortion.115 Similarly, when RFRA was attacked by public school 
and prison administrators who feared it would subject their every 
move to classic strict scrutiny, its co-sponsors took to the Senate 
floor to clarify that the restored compelling-interest test would not 
require the invalidation of all or most religiously burdensome 
government actions.116 Federal court decisions after RFRA’s 
enactment thus applied RFRA with the same modest scrutiny with 
which they had deployed the pre-Smith compelling-interest test, 
striking down some religiously burdensome government actions 
 
 113. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 8 (1972) (“Strict scrutiny” is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”). The Court has applied 
what appears to be a somewhat relaxed version of strict scrutiny to affirmative action in 
higher education. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003). This diluted version made its appearance a decade after RFRA and thus could 
not have been the standard of review RFRA meant to restore in religious exercise cases. 
 114. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2792 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (collecting quotations from RFRA’s legislative history). 
 115. See Lederman, supra note 107, at 428–31 (summarizing and quoting legislative 
history on this issue). 
 116. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May (and Why They 
Must) Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94, 119–22 (2017) 
(summarizing floor debate and subsequent amendment of RFRA clarifying that it applies 
only to “substantial” burdens on religious exercise). 
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but upholding the majority, despite its semantic resemblance to 
classic strict scrutiny.117 
Rather than performing a creative new arrangement of the 
relevant cases and history in Hobby Lobby, the Court chose the risky 
strategy of going off script. Quoting its mistaken Boerne dictum, the 
Court insisted in the face of the evidence that the pre-Smith cases 
did not use the least-restrictive means requirement enacted in 
RFRA, and on this authority concluded that “RFRA did more than 
merely restore the balancing test used in the Sherbert line of cases; 
it provided even broader protection for religious liberty than was 
available under those decisions.”118 Citing no authority other than 
its error in Boerne, and ignoring the many precedential and 
historical authorities in opposition, the Court found it “obvious” 
that RFRA and RLUIPA had effected—and had intended to effect—
a “complete separation” from the pre-Smith case law.119 The Court 
ridiculed the very suggestion that RFRA should be understood in 
terms of the pre-Smith cases: “[T]he results would be absurd if 
RFRA merely restored this Court’s pre-Smith decisions in 
ossified  form . . . .”120 
Finally, in a remarkable display of performative chutzpah, the 
Court in Hobby Lobby cited, for other purposes, numerous pre-Smith 
decisions that had also—and explicitly—included the least-
restrictive means requirement in their statement and application of 
the compelling-interest test. The Court noted in Hobby Lobby that its 
decision in Employment Division v. Smith had abandoned the 
compelling-interest test of Sherbert v. Verner.121 The Court cited and 
quoted Braunfeld v. Brown and United States v. Lee in support of its 
holding that business corporations have standing to raise free-
 
 117. Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 71–72 (2015). 
 118. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761 n.3; see id. at 2767 n.18 (“[I]n City of Boerne we stated 
that RFRA, by imposing a least-restrictive-means test, went beyond what was required by 
our pre-Smith decisions.”). 
 119. Id. at 2761–62. RLUIPA is the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act, enacted after City of Boerne invalidated the application of RFRA to the states. RLUIPA 
requires application of RFRA’s compelling-interest test to state land-use and prison laws 
and regulations which substantially burden religious exercise. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-
5 (2012). 
 120. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2773. 
 121. Id. at 2760. 
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exercise claims,122 and it distinguished Lee from its central holding 
because the former involved an exemption claim from tax rather 
than regulatory obligations.123 Finally, the Court cited Thomas v. 
Review Board in support of its holding that courts reviewing RFRA 
claims must defer to the claimant’s characterization of religious 
burden.124 As I’ve just recited, Sherbert, Braunfeld, Lee, and Thomas 
all employed least-restrictive means analysis as part of their 
respective applications of the compelling-interest test.125 The Court 
simply cherry-picked the citations and quotations it liked from each 
of these decisions without acknowledging that each of them also 
expressly invoked the very least-restrictive means requirement the 
Court claimed was “entirely new” with RFRA.126 
3. Comparing Performances 
One can perform a text without slavishly imitating it. 
Performance is both copy and original. It is now widely understood 
that even written plays and musical notation lack the fixed and 
determinate character that is habitually assigned them; directors 
and conductors have considerable discretion in deciding how to 
perform the underlying text.127 And yet, a performance might de-
part so far from the text or notation that it is no longer recognizable 
as what it purports to be; the story is being told or the music played 
in such a way that it becomes, not the “twice-behaved” behavior of 
 
 122. Id. at 2770, 2772. 
 123. Id. at 2783–84. 
 124. Id. at 2778. 
 125. See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text. 
 126. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1982) (“The state may justify a 
limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding 
governmental interest.”) (emphasis added); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) 
(“The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive 
means of achieving some compelling state interest.”) (emphasis added); Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398, 397–98 (1963) (Even assuming that the state’s interest in preventing fraud was 
sufficiently weighty to justify denying claimant’s unemployment benefits, “it would plainly 
be incumbent upon [the state] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would 
combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights.” (emphasis added)); 
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (explaining that a religiously burdensome statue 
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause “unless the State may accomplish its purpose by 
means which do not impose such a burden.” (emphasis added)). 
 127. See Levinson & Balkin, Performing Arts, supra note 10, at 1610–14; Weisbrod, supra 
note 10, at 1442. 
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performance, but the “once-behaved” behavior of something en-
tirely new.128 
Like the dialogue and notes of a play or the musical notation of 
a symphony, so also the Constitution does not woodenly yield a 
single determinate meaning; it must be creatively interpreted 
before useful meaning can emerge.129 Yet, however creatively one 
interprets the constitutional text, one must also be faithful to it. As 
Professor Scharffs has observed, the “first duty” of both musicians 
and lawyers is “fidelity to the text,” yet “interpretation is ubiqui-
tous.”130 Like the director of a play or musical, the author of a 
Supreme Court opinion might delete or add so much to the author-
ities it cites that they are no long recognizable as themselves. Daniel 
Kornstein has suggested, paraphrasing music critic Harold Schon-
berg, that judges “do” things to precedents, “sometimes elegantly 
and convincingly, sometimes outlandishly and stupidly.”131 
The Court in Smith can be understood, like Schechner’s film 
editor, to have cut and spliced “strips of decisions” to assemble a 
standard of free exercise review that was both entirely new and yet 
latent in the Court’s free exercise tradition. But a performance can 
also leave out so much of what it purports to re-enact that it must 
be taken as an entirely new work. It is simply not accurate, for 
example, to say one has “performed” a particular play by leaving 
out most of the script and substituting entirely new material. The 
Court in Hobby Lobby edited out of RFRA every pre-Smith decision 
RFRA was intended to restore, because those decisions exposed the 
lie of its narrative—that RFRA enacted the rigorous alternative-
means analysis of classic strict scrutiny. This was not a performance 
of the Court’s precedents, but a dismantling and replacing of them 
with a new legal structure. 
 
 128. Cf. Levinson & Balkin, Book Review, supra note 10, at 422 (noting that theatrical 
performances sometimes may depart from the playwright’s text to such an extent “that 
audiences wonder whether to ask for their money back”). 
 129. Cf. Frank, supra note 10, at 1261 (describing the frustrations of composers with 
performances of their work that slavishly follow notations, calling such performances 
“unbearable caricature” and “nonsense”). 
 130. Scharffs, supra note 10, at 33. 
 131. DANIEL KORNSTEIN, THE MUSIC OF THE LAWS 108 (1st ed. 1982). Kornstein reports 
Schonberg as having recounted, “As a child, [I] realized that performers ‘did’ things to 
music—sometimes elegantly and convincingly, sometimes outlandishly and stupidly. It 
puzzled me that pianists could play the same work so differently.” Id. 
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Smith’s new-performed-as-old doctrine has successfully dis-
placed the pre-Smith compelling-interest test, not despite the orig-
inality of its precedential readings, but because of them. Smith’s 
account of the precedents was both different and plausible in the 
sense that its readings were discernibly present in the precedents 
even though unconventional. It told a free-exercise story, one quite 
different from conventional pre-Smith decisions, but nevertheless 
recounted in a manner that preserved the integrity the precedents 
possessed in the older story. It is, I submit, “convincing,” if not 
quite “elegant.”132 
Whether Hobby Lobby’s implausible “restoration” of never-
before-applied classic strict scrutiny in RFRA cases will similarly 
succeed remains very much in doubt. The Court’s ignorance of 
RFRA’s statutory text and legislative history and its own numerous 
precedents to the contrary, performed an entirely new work whose 
roots in that text, history, and precedent it not only failed to 
recognize, but forcefully disclaimed. Hobby Lobby’s free exercise 
story is not simply different than the conventional one drawn from 
RFRA’s text, history, and precedent—it is told by erasing some 
precedents and violating others. “Convincing and elegant” this 
was not. 
III. PERFORMING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Unlike film directors, the Justices have no interest in taking 
credit for their performances. They strive instead to show that the 
Court’s decisions are copies of law, not the original. As Jerome 
Frank trenchantly observed, “Many a musical performer strives to 
make the music sound as if he were creating it in the act of playing 
it. But our courts . . . have tried to conceal their limited creativeness, 
have attempted to make their conduct appear as if there were no 
judicial ‘law-making.’”133 
Smith and Hobby Lobby typify judicial performance in high-
stakes Supreme Court cases. The text and the precedents bearing 
on meaning are conceptualized as fixed and stable, so that all the 
Court appears to do—and all it will admit to doing—is bloodlessly 
 
 132. See id. 
 133. Frank, supra note 10, at 1269. 
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“apply” the legal principles immanent in these purportedly 
determinate texts and precedents to the particular situation before 
it. To admit otherwise, as Menand observed, is “taboo.”134 Where 
does this powerful pressure come from? Why do the Justices feel so 
strongly the need to deny that they exercise creativity or discretion 
in deciding constitutional cases, even (or especially) when it is clear 
that they do? 
Political theory suggests one answer. Since the Constitution 
vests the legislative power in Congress, “the courts would seem to 
be acting beyond their powers were they frankly to legislate.”135 
Jurisprudential theory suggests something more subtle. The judi-
cial imperative to disguise performances of constitutional law rests 
on the ruins of a long-abandoned metaphysical foundation. That 
foundation assumed the real existence of legal principles apart 
from and prior to the situations in which they were to be applied. 
Legal principles thus paralleled the legal reality of “text” that the 
judge simply “applied,” in the same way that actors perform a 
written play or musicians perform a written score. 
Natural-law theory held that our world is imprinted with a 
moral order of right and wrong discoverable by the careful exercise 
of human reason.136 This capacity was traditionally known by an 
oft-used shorthand, “right reason.”137 True law conformed to this 
natural order, while sovereign decrees, orders, and statutes that 
violated it were thought to not really be law. “[A]s Augustine says, 
‘a law that is not just seems to be no law at all.’”138 This 
understanding gave rise to the idea of “higher” law—law existing 
independent of the sovereign and providing the ground for judging 
 
 134. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
 135. Frank, supra note 10, at 1267. 
 136. E.g., 2 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q.94.ii.co, at 222 (Fr. Laurence 
Shapcoate trans., Daniel J. Sullivan rev. trans., 2d ed. 1952) (“Now a certain order is to be 
found in those things that are apprehended by man.”); see GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PATRICK H. 
MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 49–54 (3d 
ed. 2007). 
 137. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: 
Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 608–
11 (2009). 
 138. E.g., 2 AQUINAS, supra note 136, Q.95.ii.co, at 227–28; see also Philip Soper, In Defense 
of Classical Natural Law in Legal Theory: Why Unjust Law Is No Law at All, 20 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 
201, 205 (2007). 
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the rightness or wrongness of its acts.139 Higher law, in turn, yielded 
the “rule of law,” which holds that a just legal order adheres to rule 
by laws, not by caprice of men.140 Higher law and rule of law both 
presuppose that law can truly bind the sovereign. 
Natural-law theories dominated the American nineteenth cen-
tury but were abandoned in the early twentieth century under the 
pressure of legal realism and ethical pluralism. Demonstrating the 
metaphysical existence and content of the “natural” law had always 
been difficult and controversial, and it became impossible when 
people of good will held multiple competing conceptions of the 
good, none of which could be demonstrated to be the single true 
conception. Law thus was separated from morals, as the mere 
“positive” command of the sovereign.141 Under legal positivism, 
the rightness or wrongness of such commands is irrelevant to 
whether they have the status and character of law. Realist judges 
especially derided these metaphysical pretensions, caricaturing 
natural law as a “brooding omnipresence in the sky,”142 and rule by 
a “bevy of Platonic Guardians.”143 
The positivist abandonment of natural law shifted judicial 
attention from metaphysics to texts. If law is merely the command 
of the sovereign, then judging must be largely textual. To decide a 
case, a judge cannot access the metaphysical natural law but must 
instead find a positively enacted written law, like the Constitution, 
to apply to the case. The Constitution stands in for the higher law, 
in place of now-abandoned natural law. Higher-law texts enable 
the Supreme Court to honor the myths of higher law and rule of 
law without elaborating their metaphysical foundations: the Court 
 
 139. See Gedicks, supra note 137, at 608–11. 
 140. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The History and Elements of the Rule of Law, 2012 SING. J. LEGAL 
STUD. 232, 243–44 (2012); see also STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL 
REASONING 2 (2d ed. 1995) (“By the most widely accepted accounts, the rule of law requires 
coercion to be used by officials only when and as authorized by the law.”). 
 141. 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 
86–103 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885); see also H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation 
of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1957). 
 142. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting), superseded by 
statute, Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 69-803, 44 
Stat. 1424. 
 143. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958). 
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merely applies the Constitution.144 Though it can no longer appeal 
to natural law, it can treat “the Constitution” as a higher law that 
compels and justifies the result in a particular case.145 
Applying the metaphors of musical and theatrical performance 
to legal decision-making suggests that the underlying text con-
strains performance to some considerable extent, even if there is 
need for performative creativity.146 The difficulty in applying this 
to constitutional decision-making is that many provisions of the 
Constitution are, as H.L.A. Hart described it, “open-textured,” 
consisting of vague standards rather than specific directives.147 This 
is particularly true of individual rights provisions. “Congress shall 
pass no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion points in 
the direction of religious liberty but is far too abstract to decide 
most individual cases of government interference with religious 
practice. It is a bit like performing the skeletal narrative, “Boy 
meets girl, boy gets girl, girl dumps boy, girl takes boy back”—the 
formula for literally hundreds, if not thousands, of American 
plays and films. It is not meaningful to say these all perform the 
same story. 
When the Court applies “open-textured” standards, therefore, 
it becomes hard to maintain the fiction that it is merely “interpre-
ting” the text—elaborating meaning that is semantically obvious 
from the face of the text.148 Rather, the Court is necessarily 
“construing” or “constructing” the law of free exercise of religion—
 
 144. See James J. Hamula, Comment, Philosophical Hermeneutics: Toward an Alternative 
View of Adjudication, 1984 BYU L. REV. 323, 338. 
 145. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 146. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 10, at 1272 (“Just as, perforce, the musical composer 
delegates some subordinate creative activity to musical performers, so, perforce, the legislature 
delegates some subordinate judicial legislation—i.e., creative activity—to the courts.” 
(emphasis added)); Levinson & Balkin, Performing Arts, supra note 10, at 1613 (characterizing 
“both the text of the Constitution and the score of Beethoven’s Pastorale Symphony are 
commands inscribed in signs”); Weisbrod, supra note 10, at 1441 (“There is, in both [law and 
music], a script.”). 
 147. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124–36 (3d ed. 2012). 
 148. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 13–
14 (1980). 
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in short, making law up.149 As these constructions accumulate 
through the adjudication of individual cases, they constitute 
“doctrines” that often eclipse the constitutional text they purport 
merely to interpret. 
This leaves constitutional performance dangling. Hans-Georg 
Gadamer explained how and why this is so.150 Whereas in the 
conventional understanding judges merely “apply” abstract pre-
existing principles to the case before them, this very understanding 
assumes that such principles can exist wholly apart from the judge 
who applies them. Gadamer attacks this assumption, arguing that 
legal principles do not exist in such an objective factual state.151 Any 
text is always already embedded in an interpretive tradition that 
shapes and pre-determines its meaning; it does not and cannot exist 
in the pristine self-existence presupposed by the conventional 
understanding.152 Any interpreter, moreover, comes to the text with 
problems and projects whose solution is a matter of importance, not 
as a wholly disinterested observer seeking the only and true 
 
 149. “Statutory construction” has long been a part of legal interpretation, but its 
application to the Constitution was only recently theorized, primarily in the work of Keith 
Whittington. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, 
INTERPRETATION]; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED 
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION]. 
Whittington defines “construction” as a fundamentally subjective and normative process of 
creating constitutional meaning. WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra, at 5. With con-
struction, factors external to the text, such as contemporary policy considerations, social 
interests, and partisan politics, combine with the text to build out its meaning. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTRUCTION, supra, at 6. 
Because construction is a fundamentally political process that operates in the 
interstices of the Constitution by projecting meaning onto the text, Whittington considers it 
fundamentally inconsistent with the judicial role of merely interpreting the Constitution—
deriving “relatively narrow rules” in the form of “doctrines, formulas, and tests” that resolve 
legal disputes. WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra, at 5–6. He thus confines construction 
to the political branches. WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra, at 7; WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTRUCTION, supra, at 6–7. Later theorists, however, have embraced construction as a 
necessary and legitimate part of judicial decision-making in constitutional disputes. See, e.g., 
JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 300–12 (2011); RANDY E BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 121–30 (rev. ed. 2014); Lawrence B. Solum, 
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013). 
 150. See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & 
Donald G. Marshall rev. trans., 2nd rev. ed. 2004). 
 151. Id. at 334–39. 
 152. Id. at 302–10. 
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meaning of the text.153 There is an interpretive “arc” or “horizon” 
that connects the interpreter and the text; the history of the text 
moves forward in time along the arc, while the concerns of the 
interpreter work back; understanding occurs when they meet.154 
If I review a book about Plato, for example, I cannot write only 
my own thoughts about Plato without considering the book’s 
discussion of him and his philosophy; that would not be a review 
of the book. On the other hand, it is implausible to demand that, in 
discussing the book, I ignore my own thoughts and commitments 
about Plato, as well as those of other Plato scholars. That’s not a 
review of the book either.155 
The constitutional law of equal protection provides another 
instructive example. Imagine the absurdity of trying to decide an 
affirmative action case—say, Grutter v. Bollinger156—as if Brown v. 
Board of Education had never been decided.157 Brown is part of the 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause—though it wasn’t always. 
The decision in Brown—and each case that preceded it,158 and 
 
 153. Id. at 316–18. Gadamer’s hermeneutics is founded upon Martin Heidegger’s 
rejection of Cartesian ontology, which assumes the separation of an interior subject from the 
exterior and objective world, in favor of “Being-in-the-world,” which assumes that there is 
not and can never be a moment when human beings are not already engaged in relations 
with persons and things in the world. See, e.g., MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME ¶¶ 12, 
19–25 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., 1962). For a succinct and accessible 
account of Heideggerian ontology, see Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 
106 YALE L.J. 253, 262–71 (1996). 
 154. GADAMER, supra note 150, at 301–05. 
 155. The example is from DONATELLA DI CESARE, GADAMER: A PHILOSOPHICAL POR-
TRAIT 88 (Niall Keane trans., 2013). 
   156.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding use of race among several 
factors as legitimate means of admitting a diverse class to state professional school under 
Equal Protection Clause). 
 157. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating de jure segregation of 
public schools under Equal Protection Clause). 
 158. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (finding that the exclusion of African 
Americans from the flagship state law school and their confinement to an alternative state 
African American law school violated Equal Protection Clause because facilities were not 
equal); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (holding the same regarding denial of 
admission to otherwise qualified African American to state law school, where state did not 
have alternative law school); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding 
Equal Protection Clause requires equal opportunities to study law for African Americans 
and whites, though not necessarily in the same school or location); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that racially segregated rail passenger cars does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 483. 
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followed it159—altered the meaning of the Clause. Attempting to 
apply the clause in the absence of these cases—and particularly the 
case that (now) most informs that meaning (Brown)—would make 
no sense. On the other hand, imagine the equivalent absurdity of 
trying to decide an affirmative action case as if one had no personal 
knowledge, sense, or conviction about the morality or legality of 
race-conscious decision-making in higher education and the 
controversies it has engendered. This is to ask a person to decide 
the case as if she were not herself, but instead some impossibly 
disembodied being wholly disengaged from the world. It is 
precisely one’s own prior understanding of a constitutional text 
that connects her to the possible meanings of that text in the 
situation that calls for decision—that is, whether affirmative action 
in higher education is consistent with the meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause.160 
Gadamer’s argument is a version of the ancient problem of 
universals and particulars.161 As Aristotle showed, in scientific and 
theoretical thought universally valid rules (universals) govern 
specific situations that fall under them (particulars);162 this is what 
it means to say that scientific knowledge can be demonstrated to an-
other.163 In case of practical knowledge, however, a universally 
valid rule cannot be formulated in advance of the situation in which 
it is applied, because the universal is in the particulars.164 Determin-
ing the right thing to do in a particular situation depends instead on 
both the character of the decision maker and the characteristics of 
 
 159. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that 
the Equal Protection Clause requires racially neutral federal decision-making); City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding the same with respect to state 
decision-making). 
 160. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Conservatives, Liberals, Romantics: The Persistent Quest 
for Certainty in Constitutional Interpretation, 50 VAND. L. REV. 613, 639 (1997) (“[T]he expec-
tations of meaning that attached to the [Equal Protection C]lause after Brown unavoidably 
affect how the original understanding is understood in any contemporary post-Brown 
situation[,] . . . but contemporary cases like Brown have just as clearly affected the original 
understanding of equality.” (footnote omitted)). 
 161. GADAMER, supra note 150, at 310–11. 
 162. Nichomachean Ethics vi.3 1139b23-31, vi.6 1140b31 [hereinafter NE] (W.D. Ross & 
J.O. Urmson rev. trans., 1894), in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 1799, 1801 
(Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE]. 
 163. NE vi.3 1139b31-32, vi.6 1140b32-33, in ARISTOTLE, supra note 162, at 1799, 1801. 
 164. NE vi.5 1140a30-1140b4, in ARISTOTLE, supra note 162, at 1800. 
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the situation that demands action.165 The relation is dialogical: the 
judgment of the right action to take in a particular situation de-
pends on who the agent is, but who the agent is depends on the 
actions she takes in such situations.166 
Judging is a form of practical reasoning. This is why Aristotle 
insisted that general legal rules must always be supplemented by 
equitable interpretation: “[T]his is the nature of the equitable, a 
correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality. In 
fact this is the reason why all things are not determined by law, viz. 
that about some things it is impossible to lay down a law . . . .”167 
Certainly, lawyers know, in the way that only experience can teach, 
that general legal rules rarely suffice to resolve legal disputes. 
Resolution depends, rather, on the character of judge and jury, on 
the quality of legal representation, and on the specific facts of the 
situation that gives rise to dispute. The purportedly fixed and 
independent legal principles that judges and fact-finders apply are 
merely temporary or provisional, their meaning changing with 
each application. To assume otherwise is to commit the mistake of 
reification—to act as if an abstract principle or rule has an inde-
pendent existence apart from the real-world situations that give it 
form and meaning.168 
The interpreter of a legal text can understand that text only in 
terms of its applications. Every new application changes the con-
tent of the principle, just as Brown changed the meaning of “equal 
protection” since Plessy, Adarand and City of Richmond changed it 
since Brown, Grutter since Adarand and City of Richmond, and on to 
Fisher and other applications (and meanings) hardly yet imagined. 
As Gadamer encapsulated this point, to be understood at all, the 
legal text “must be understood at every moment, in every concrete 
situation, in a new and different way. Understanding here is always 
application.”169 There is no difference between the questions, “What 
 
 165. NE i.3 1094b28, 1095b3 & -6-8, ii.2 1104a4-5, in ARISTOTLE, supra note 162, at 
1730, 1744. 
 166. NE ii.5 1105b9-12, iii.5 1114a2015-23, in ARISTOTLE, supra note 162, at 1746, 1758. 
 167. NE v.10 1137b26-29, in ARISTOTLE, supra note 162, at 1796. 
 168. See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 136–37 (1975). 
See generally Georg Lukács, Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat, in HISTORY AND 
CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS: STUDIES IN MARXIST DIALECTICS 83 (Rodney Livingstone trans., 1971). 
 169. GADAMER, supra note 150, at 307–08. 
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does this text mean?” and “How should this text apply in this case?” 
Meaning always—and only—arises out of application. 
Gadamer’s critique exposes the quandary of judicial decision-
making. Judges purport to apply pre-existent legal principles, in 
service to higher-law and rule-of-law norms. But the principles 
they apply are altered, created anew, in the very act of applying 
them. The embarrassment of constitutional decision-making is that 
it cannot help but contradict the fundamental norms by which it 
claims to be guided. Decision-making is not a bloodless and uncom-
mitted application of prior precedents, but their performance. 
CONCLUSION: WORKING WITHOUT A NET 
Felix Cohen once facetiously related how a great jurist died 
and went to a special heaven reserved for legal theorists.170 There 
he met, “face to face, the many concepts of jurisprudence in their 
absolute purity, freed from all entangling alliances with human 
life.”171 He met “the disembodied spirits of good faith and bad faith, 
property, possession, laches, and rights in rem.”172 Here also were 
many great machines of conceptual jurisprudence, including “a 
dialectic-hydraulic-interpretation press, which could press an 
indefinite number of meanings out of any text or statute,” and “a 
hair-splitting machine that could divide a single hair into 
999,999 parts.”173 
The boundless opportunities of this heaven of legal concepts were 
open to all properly qualified jurists, provided only they drank 
the Lethean draught which induced forgetfulness of terrestrial hu-
man affairs. But for the most accomplished of jurists the Lethean 
draught was entirely superfluous. They had nothing to forget.174 
As Cohen’s formalist parody suggests, the idea that judges can 
uncover the law in some elevated isolated state, untainted by social 
need or other judicial taboos, rests on a metaphysics that no one—
least of all Supreme Court Justices—any longer takes seriously. The 
Court has its precedents, but its readings are traditional rather than 
 
 170. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. 
REV. 809, 809–10 (1935). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
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formalist, rarely so fixed and determinate as to yield only one 
possible result. This makes the Court’s constitutional decision-
making the purest of performances—iterated citations, shorn from 
their original contexts and dropped into new ones, creating new 
and surprising principles that masquerade as old and established. 
It is pointless to call this dishonest. The Justices cannot admit 
their performative role because it cannot be reconciled with still-
powerful higher-law and rule-of-law myths. If law does not exist 
outside the case in which the judge applies it, if it is not a stable 
premise of judicial decision-making but a function of the judge and 
the situation, how are we governed by “law rather than men” 
(and women)? 
The necessity of performing constitutional law stems from the 
absence of a definitive underlying text that can constrain the sub-
stance of that performance; there are, instead, innumerable indeter-
minate texts, which makes judicial performance unavoidable. The 
Justices are always working without a net, performing constitu-
tional law in opinions with nothing beneath them. Sometimes they 
pull off a convincing performance, but sometimes they don’t—and 
we need to recognize the difference. 
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